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R 091948Z JAN 03 ZYB PSN 722401116
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N6142//
TO AIG 439
RULSFAF/PEO CARRIERS WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMA/PEO SURFACE STRIKE WASHINGTON DC
RULSSBI/PEO EXW WASHINGTON DC
RUWDHBV/PEO IT DET SAN DIEGO CA
RUWDHBV/PEO IT WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/PEO IT WASHINGTON DC
RULSSBG/PEO MUW WASHINGTON DC
RULSSBE/PEO SUB WASHINGTON DC
RULSSBF/PEO SURFSHIPASWSYS WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMA/PEO THEATER SURFACE COMBATANTS WASHINGTON DC DET
RULSFAO/PEOASWASM PATUXENT RIVER MD
RHMFIUU/PEOASWASM PATUXENT RIVER MD
RULSDMA/PEOCMPANDUAV DET WPC WASHINGTON DC
RHFJFNS/PEOWTPO CHERRY PT NC
RHMFIUU/PEOWTPO CHERRY PT NC
RULSFAP/PEOTACAIR PATUXENT RIVER MD
RHMFIUU/PEOTACAIR PATUXENT RIVER MD
RULSINP/NCTF-CND WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMA/PEOTACAIR PMA TWO FOUR ONE DET JACKSONVILLE FL
RHFJJBH/PEOTACAIR PMA TWO SEVEN TWO DET JACKSONVILLE FL
RHMFIUU/PEOTACAIR PMA TWO SEVEN TWO DET JACKSONVILLE FL
RUWFADP/PEOTACAIR PMA TWO THREE ONE DET NORTH ISLAND CA
RHMFIUU/PEOTACAIR PMA TWO THREE ONE DET NORTH ISLAND CA
INFO RUCOAHQ/COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA//N6//
RHMFIUU/COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA//N6//
RHFJBRQ/SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON SC//72/723//
RHMFIUU/SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON SC//72/723//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC
RUCBLFB/COMMARFORLANT
RHMFIUU/COMMARFORLANT
RULSMDC/MITNOC QUANTICO VA
RHMFIUU/MITNOC QUANTICO VA
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/-/JAN//

SUBJ/UPDATE OF PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (PDS) GUIDANCE//
REF/A/NAVSO PUB/OPNAV/01OCT1997/P-5239-22/NOTAL//
REF/B/INST/OPNAV/10JAN2002/C5510.93F/NOTAL//
REF/C/INST/SECNAV/17MAR1999/5510.36//
NARR/REF A PROVIDES PDS IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE.
REF B CONTAINS NAVY/MARINE CORPS PDS IMPLEMENTATION. REF C PROVIDES
THE DON PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.//
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RMKS/1. THIS IS A COORDINATED N6142 AND N09N2 MESSAGE.
2. REQUEST WIDEST DISTRIBUTION OF THIS UPDATED GUIDANCE.
3. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES CLARIFICATION OF GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF
A AS IMPLEMENTED BY REF B AND SHALL BE USED FOR PDS EVALUATIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATIONS PENDING UPDATE AND REISSUANCE OF REF A.

4. REF A UTILIZES DEFINITIONS FOR VARIOUS ACCESS AREAS RELATED TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (PDS) WHICH
HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE CONFUSING AND PRONE TO INCONSISTENT
INTERPRETATION, SPECIFICALLY, THE TERMS CONTROLLED ACCESS AREA
(CAA), LIMITED CONTROLLED AREA (LCA) AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS AREA
(UAA). THESE DEFINITIONS NEED TO BE REVISED TO MORE ACCURATELY

REFLECT THE REQUIREMENTS OF NAVSO P-5239-22 (REF A) AND MORE CLOSELY WITH THE DON INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM (ISP) REGULATION SECNAVINST 5510.36 (REF C). OF SPECIFIC CONCERN IS THE POSSIBLE PROLIFERATION OF SIPRNET CONNECTIVITY WITHIN A PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT WHERE ADEQUATE SECURITY IS NOT BEING APPLIED TO THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE NETWORKS. THESE INCLUDE, BUT MAY NOT BE LIMITED TO, THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, WORKSTATIONS, PERIPHERALS, MEDIA AND PRINTERS. THE APPLICATION OF REF A, IN CONJUNCTION WITH REQUIREMENTS OF REF C, WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HANDLED AND PROCESSED IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS WHERE A PDS IS INSTALLED. IN ADDITION TO THE PDS, ALL INFORMATION ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE ANY SYSTEM IS ACCREDITED BY THE DAA TO PROCESS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

5. THE FOLLOWING NEW/REVISED DEFINITIONS WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE UPDATED PDS GUIDEBOOK AND SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY IN THE REVIEW AND APPLICATION OF REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN REF A.

A. APPROVED PDS LOCK - A COMBINATION PADLOCK CONFORMING WITH FEDERAL SPECIFICATION FF-P-110. THIS LOCK IS RESISTANT TO SURREPTITIOUS MANIPULATION, RATHER THAN RESISTANT TO PHYSICAL PENETRATION AS IN "HIGH SECURITY" LOCKS. THE S&G 8077 IS AN EXAMPLE OF AN APPROVED PDS LOCK.

B. SECURE ROOM (SR) [THIS TERM IS A NEW DEFINITION IN NAVSO P-5239-22] - A PHYSICAL AREA WHICH MEETS THE CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS PER EXHIBIT 10A OF SECNAVINST 5510.36 FOR "OPEN STORAGE" AT THE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL OF THE INFORMATION BEING PROCESSED. A PDS IS NOT REQUIRED FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCESSED AT OR BELOW THE AUTHORIZED "OPEN STORAGE" LEVEL FOR THE SR.

C. CONTROLLED ACCESS AREA (CAA) [THIS TERM IS A CLARIFIED DEFINITION OF THE CURRENT NAVSO P-5239-22 CAA DEFINITION] - A PHYSICAL AREA (E.G., BUILDING, ROOM, ETC.) WHICH IS UNDER PHYSICAL CONTROL AND TO WHICH ONLY PERSONNEL CLEARED TO THE LEVEL OF THE INFORMATION BEING PROCESSED ARE AUTHORIZED UNRESTRICTED ACCESS. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL ARE EITHER ESCORTED BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL OR ARE UNDER CONTINUOUS SURVEILLANCE. A CAA SHALL COMPLY WITH THE PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3 OF APPENDIX B TO NAVSO P-5239-22. WITHIN A CAA, A PDS WILL NOT BE REQUIRED FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCESSED AT OR BELOW THE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL OF THE CAA. WHILE UNPROTECTED CABLES MAY BE RUN WITHIN THE CAA, THEY WILL NOT BE RUN OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER OF THE CAA. SAFEGUARDING AND STORAGE OF MAGNETIC AND HARDCOPY MEDIA WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECNAVINST 5510.36 (REF C).

D. RESTRICTED ACCESS AREA (RAA) [THE RAA CONCEPT WAS PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED UNDER THE OLD CAA DEFINITION BUT IS BEING SEPARATED OUT TO ENABLE A MORE CONSISTENT IDENTIFICATION OF AREAS WHERE DIFFERENT PDS REQUIREMENTS APPLY] - A PHYSICAL AREA (E.G., BUILDING, ROOM, ETC.) TO WHICH ONLY PERSONNEL CLEARED TO THE LEVEL OF THE INFORMATION BEING PROCESSED ARE AUTHORIZED UNRESTRICTED ACCESS, BUT DOES NOT MEET ALL OF THE PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3 OF APPENDIX B TO NAVSO P-5239-22. A PDS AND A LOCK BOX EQUIPPED WITH AN APPROVED PDS LOCK IS REQUIRED IN A RAA. THE PDS SHALL BE EXTENDED WITHIN THE RAA TO A LOCATION IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE WORKSTATION AND SHALL BE TERMINATED IN THE LOCK BOX WHICH CONTAINS THE CONNECTION FOR THE NETWORK. THE WORKSTATION SHALL BE CONNECTED TO THE NETWORK VIA THIS TERMINATION AND, AT THE END OF EACH DAY, THE WORKSTATION SHALL BE DISCONNECTED, THE CABLE STORED IN THE LOCK BOX THAT IS SECURED WITH AN APPROVED PDS LOCK. THE WORKSTATION USED ON THIS TYPE OF CONNECTION SHOULD BE A PORTABLE WORKSTATION WHICH CAN BE SECURED IN AN APPROVED GSA CONTAINER PER RED C FOR THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION BEING PROCESSED. AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD WOULD BE TO APPLY "TAMPER EVIDENT" TAPE TO THE CHASSIS AND COVER OF A DESKTOP COMPUTER. PRINTERS AND OTHER DEVICES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NETWORK

SHALL BE LOCATED IN EITHER A CAA OR SR LOCATION, OR LOCATED WITHIN A LOCK BOX WHICH IS SECURED WITH AN APPROVED PDS LOCK. THE ACCESS DOORS TO THE RAA SHALL COMPLY WITH THE ASSOCIATED REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3 OF APPENDIX B OF NAVSO P-5239-22. SAFEGUARDING AND STORAGE OF MAGNETIC AND HARDCOPY MEDIA SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER 10 OF SECNAVINST 5510.36.

E. LIMITED ACCESS AREA (LAA) [THIS TERM IS A CLARIFICATION UPDATE OF THE NAVSO P-5239-22 LCA DEFINITION] - A PHYSICAL AREA (E.G., A MILITARY BASE IN THE CONUS) WHICH IS UNDER DIRECT U.S. PHYSICAL CONTROL AND TO WHICH ONLY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ARE ADMITTED. ACCESS IS NOT USUALLY BASED ON CLEARANCE LEVEL BUT RATHER ON THE PRESENTATION OF AN APPROVED CREDENTIAL (E.G., PICTURE BADGE WITH/WITHOUT OTHER TECHNOLOGIES (MAGNETIC STRIP, BAR CODE, ETC.); VISITOR PASS ISSUED AFTER VERIFICATION OF PICTURE ID; ETC.). VERIFICATION CAN BE VIA GUARD INSPECTION OR ELECTRONIC PROCESSING. WITHIN THE LAA A PDS, INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAVSO P-5239-22, IS ALWAYS REQUIRED.

THE PDS SHALL NOT TERMINATE WITHIN A LAA.

F. UNCONTROLLED ACCESS AREA (UAA) [THIS TERM IS A CLARIFICATION UPDATE OF THE NAVSO P-5239-22 UAA DEFINITION] - A PHYSICAL AREA (E.G., MILITARY BASE IN AN OCONUS LOCATION) WHICH IS NOT UNDER DIRECT U.S. PHYSICAL CONTROL AND TO WHICH UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL MAY GAIN UNRESTRICTED ACCESS. A PDS SHALL NOT BE INSTALLED IN A UAA. IF OTHER APPROVED PROTECTIVE MEASURES (I.E., USE OF A NSA TYPE 1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEVICE) CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED, A WAIVER SHALL BE REQUESTED FROM CNO (N6142) VIA THE SPAWARSSYSCEN CHARLESTON (CODE 723) PDS TECHNICAL REVIEW AUTHORITY.

6. THE FOLLOWING UPDATES OF APPENDIX B OF NAVSO P-5239-22 SHALL BE USED IN LIEU OF THAT CONTAINED IN REF A UNTIL SUCH TIME AS REF A HAS BEEN UPDATED AND RELEASED.

A. SECTION 3. PHYSICAL SECURITY - THE OBJECTIVE IS TO DETER UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL FROM GAINING ACCESS TO THE PDS, INCLUDING ATTACHED WORKSTATIONS, AND TO INSURE UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS IS DISCOVERED. TABLE B-1 OF NAVSO P-5239-22 SPECIFIES PDS GUIDANCE FOR DIFFERENT AREAS OF CONTROL BY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL. IN ADDITION, IF THE PDS TERMINATES WITHIN A CAA OR AN RAA, ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY, AS DESCRIBED BELOW, SHALL BE PROVIDED TO PREVENT UNDETECTED ACCESS TO THE PDS TERMINATION. [NOTE: A PDS SHALL NEVER TERMINATE WITHIN AN LAA OR AN UAA.] THE USER(S) OF THE WORKSTATION AND OCCUPANT(S) OF THE AREA(S) SHALL MAINTAIN AN AWARENESS OF THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE WORKSTATION AREA, SO AS TO BE ABLE TO DETECT ANY ATTEMPT AT FORCED/COVERT ENTRY. DAILY INSPECTIONS OF THE PDS AND TERMINATION(S) SHALL BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TABLE B-2 OF NAVSO P-5239-22.

(1). WALLS, FLOOR AND ROOF. THE WALLS, FLOOR, AND ROOF CONSTRUCTION SHALL BE OF PERMANENT CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS; I.E. PLASTER, GYPSUM WALLBOARD, METAL PANELS, HARDBOARD, WOOD, PLYWOOD, OR OTHER MATERIALS OFFERING RESISTANCE TO, AND EVIDENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO THE AREA. WALLS SHALL BE EXTENDED FROM TRUE FLOOR TO TRUE CEILING WITH PERMANENT CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, WIRE MESH, OR 18-GUAGE EXPANDED STEEL SCREEN. IF THE WALLS CANNOT BE EXTENDED, THEN AN IDS SHALL BE INSTALLED SO AS TO MONITOR THE SPACE ABOVE THE TERMINAL ROOM.

(2). DOORS. THE ACCESS DOOR TO THE AREA SHALL BE SUBSTANTIALLY CONSTRUCTED OF WOOD OR METAL. AS A MINIMUM, THE DOOR SHALL HAVE A HIGH SECURITY DEAD BOLT LOCK WITH A 1 INCH THROW, WITH A CYLINDER WHICH MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES INC. UL437 STANDARD FOR KEY LOCKS, 7TH EDITION DATED 4 AUGUST 2000. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, A BUILT-IN GSA-APPROVED COMBINATION LOCK MEETING FEDERAL SPECIFICATION FF-L-2740 CAN BE USED. THE HINGE PINS OF OUTSWING DOORS SHALL BE PEENED, BRAZED, OR SPOT-WELDED TO PREVENT REMOVAL. WHEN DOUBLE DOORS ARE USED, AN ASTRAGAL WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE ACTIVE LEAF OF THE DOOR. DOORS OTHER THAN THE ACCESS DOOR

SHALL BE SECURED FROM THE INSIDE (FOR EXAMPLE, BY A DEAD BOLT LOCK, PANIC DEAD BOLT LOCK, OR RIGID WOOD OR METAL BAR WHICH EXTENDS ACROSS THE WIDTH OF THE DOOR, OR BY ANY OTHER MEANS THAT WILL PREVENT ENTRY FROM THE OUTSIDE. PROCEDURES SHALL BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT DOORS ARE SECURED AT THE END OF THE WORK DAY. DURING WORKING HOURS, THE TERMINAL AREA SHALL BE 1) OCCUPIED; 2) HAVE ACCESS CONTROLLED THROUGH USE OF A CIPHER OR SIMPLEX LOCK, OR A SWIPE BADGE SYSTEM; OR, 3) HAVE THE DOORS LOCKED WHEN UNOCCUPIED.

(3). WINDOWS. ALL WINDOWS WHICH MIGHT REASONABLY AFFORD VISUAL OBSERVATION OF CLASSIFIED ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FACILITY SHALL BE MADE OPAQUE OR EQUIPPED WITH BLINDS, DRAPES, OR OTHER COVERINGS. WINDOWS THAT ARE LESS THAN 18 FEET ABOVE THE GROUND MEASURED FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE WINDOW, OR ARE EASILY ACCESSIBLE BY MEANS OF OBJECTS DIRECTLY BENEATH THE WINDOWS SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED FROM OR COVERED WITH MATERIALS WHICH PROVIDE INDICATIONS OF ANY ATTEMPT OF FORCED ENTRY. THE PROTECTION PROVIDED TO THE WINDOWS NEED BE NO STRONGER THAN THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTIGUOUS WALLS.

(4). OPENINGS. UTILITY OPENINGS SUCH AS DUCTS AND VENTS SHALL BE KEPT AT LESS THAN MAN-PASSABLE (96 SQUARE INCHES) OPENING. OPENINGS LARGER THAN 96 SQUARE INCHES SHALL BE HARDENED PER THE MILITARY HANDBOOK 1013/1B.

B. UPDATED TABLES IN APPENDIX B OF NAVSO P-5239-22

(1). TABLE B-1 - IN BOTH THE LOW AND MEDIUM THREAT CHARTS, CHANGE UAA TO LAA AND CHANGE LCA TO RAA. CAA REMAINS UNCHANGED. UPDATE THE LEGEND TO DELETE LCA AND ADD RAA - RESTRICTED ACCESS AREA AND LAA - LIMITED ACCESS AREA.

(2). TABLE B-2 - IN BOTH THE LOW AND MEDIUM THREAT CHARTS, CHANGE UAA TO LAA AND CHANGE LCA TO RAA.

7. AS NOTED ABOVE, THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES CLARIFICATION OF REF A. THEREFORE, A CURRENTLY APPROVED PDS WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT FOR RE-EVALUATION UNDER THIS CLARIFICATION. ANY ADDITIONS, EXTENSIONS, OR MODIFICATIONS TO AN EXISTING PDS WILL REQUIRE THAT THE ENTIRE PDS BE RE-EVALUATED. SYSTEMS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW WILL BE EVALUATED TO DETERMINE COMPLIANCE WITH REF A AS UPDATED BY THIS MESSAGE. IF DEVIATIONS EXIST, THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY CAN EITHER REQUIRE FULL COMPLIANCE PRIOR TO APPROVAL OR ALLOW A PERIOD OF UP TO 12 MONTHS FOR FULL COMPLIANCE. AN INTERIM APPROVAL IS AUTHORIZED WITHOUT FULL COMPLIANCE ONCE A POA&M TO CORRECT THE DEVIATIONS HAS BEEN SUBMITTED AND APPROVED AND APPROVED.

8. ONCE AGAIN, A PDS MUST BE SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW/APPROVAL PRIOR TO INITIATION OF THE INSTALLATION. IF A PDS APPROVAL REQUEST IS SUBMITTED AFTER INSTALLATION AND FOUND TO BE NON-COMPLIANT WITH REF A AS AND THIS CLARIFICATION, THE PDS WILL NOT BE APPROVED UNTIL IDENTIFIED CORRECTIONS ARE MADE. AN INTERIM APPROVAL PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 12 MONTHS WILL BE ALLOWED FOR COMPLETION OF IDENTIFIED CORRECTIONS.

9. IF A COMMAND IDENTIFIES THE ENTIRE AREA WITHIN WHICH A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WILL BE INSTALLED AS A CAA IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A AS CLARIFIED BY PARA 5 OF THIS MESSAGE, A PDS WILL NOT BE REQUIRED. THE SSAA DOCUMENTATION MUST INDICATE THAT THE AREA HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CAA IAW REF A AND THE CLARIFICATION IN PARA 5 OF THIS MESSAGE. FURTHER THE CAA MUST FULLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX B OF REF A AS UPDATED BY PARAGRAPH 6 OF THIS MESSAGE.//

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